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The dominant model of organisation control was developed by Ouchi and his colleagues. It predicts 
the choice among control modes as a function of the task context. It has two limitations. One is that it 
predicts the choice of control modes but not the effect of those choices on performance. The other is 
that it restricts that choice to a single control mode for a specific context and does not consider the 
choice of a combination or portfolio of control modes, which the same literature frequently describes 
as practice. Here, contributing to control theory, these two limitations are addressed through the 
development of a more complete and complex normative model which includes interactions among 
modes and their effect on performance. This model has important implications for both the theory and 
practice of outsourcing, IT project methodology and IT-based organisational transformation. 
Keywords: organisational control, control modes, output control, input control, behavioural control, 
project performance, exploitative learning, exploratory learning . 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Organizational control theory (Ouchi 1977, 1979, Eisenhardt 1985, Snell 1992) has frequently been 
applied in the context of both in-house ISD projects (Kirsch 1996, 1997, Henderson and Lee 1992) 
and outsourced ISD projects (Kirsch et al. 2002, Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003, Rustagi et al. 2008). 
Extant control theory examines how managers make the choice of a specific control mode, including 
the choice of output control (e.g. setting and verifying project targets), behaviour control (e.g. specify 
detailed procedure of how conduct tasks) or input control (e.g. the selection and training of personnel). 
However, the dominant control framework suffers from a number of limitations (Cardinal et al. 2004; 
Kirsch et al. 2002) and, as a result, could have constrained our understanding of the effects of control 
modes on performance.  
The purpose of this paper is to identify the limitations of the extant control theory; develop a new 
framework that predicts the effect of control modes on performance; and, finally, elaborate how the 
framework can increase our understanding of how to effectively control information systems 
development (ISD) projects.  
In practice, various control modes are typically implemented through organisation-wide processes 
such as PRINCE II and the Capability Maturity Model (CMM) developed by the Software 
Engineering Institute (SEI). Drawing on the literature of the effects of CMM implementation on IS 
project performance, we show that the new normative framework explains the findings better than the 
dominant control theory framework with important implications for practice. 
Below, the literature is reviewed and nine hypotheses are developed. Then, the extension to the 
dominant control model is summarized. Finally, implications for theory development and practice are 
discussed, and limitations of the study are outlined.  
2 ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL THEORY 
The dominant model of organization control was developed by Ouchi and his colleagues in a series of 
papers beginning with Ouchi and McGuire (1975) and ending with Snell (1992). Ouchi and McGuire 
began by analyzing the conditions that govern the use of output and behavior control by managers. 
Ouchi (1977) develops the model and presents it in the familiar 2x2 matrix form, with dimensions of 
availability of output measures and knowledge of transformation processes. The model predicts the 
use of behavior or output control in the high/high cell and the use of ritual in the low/low cell. Ritual is 
replaced with clan control in Ouchi (1979, 1980) and with input control in Snell (1992). The resultant, 
frequently cited model is presented in Figure 1. 
Inspecting Figure 1 highlights two issues. One is that the model proposes a contingent framework for 
managers’ choices of control modes, rather than of the effects of those choices on performance. The 
other is that the model specifies either a single mode of control or, in the high/high cell, a choice 
between two modes. Combinations of modes are not included in the model. These two issues are the 
basis of the two questions framing this research. 
First, the model presented in Figure 1 predicts the choices of control modes by managers. If a task is 
well understood, it is possible to specify the behaviors necessary to achieve the planned result. Thus, 
behavior control is appropriate. If it is easy to measure outputs, then outputs can be monitored and 
controlled to deliver the planned result. Thus, output control is appropriate. If neither of these 
conditions holds, input control is the default mode.  
While Ouchi (1977) claims that the model is normative, it is only normative in the limited sense that 
rational managers would adopt an appropriate control mode given the context.  Subsequent research 
on the model in Figure 1 and its derivatives typically assumes, rather than formally tests, the effects on 
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performance of the control modes chosen. The limited empirical research reports results that are 
sometimes inconsistent with Ouchi’s implicit normative framework. For example, while Cardinal 
(2001) reports, consistent with Ouchi’s framework, that input control enhances innovation, she also 
reports, inconsistent with Ouchi’s framework, that output control enhances innovation in R&D project 
management, where task uncertainty is high. Other studies show that over-reliance on outcome control 
leads to gaming behavior, misrepresentation of performance (Bevan & Hood 2006, Heinrich 2002, 
2007) and thus negative performance effects. These findings, combined with the importance of 
organization control, motivated the first of the two questions framing this research: How do control 
modes affect organization performance? 
  
 







                   
 




Ability to measure outputs 






 Behavior   
 
 
*Adapted from Ouchi (1979), Eisenhardt (1985) and Govindarajan and Fisher (1990) 
Figure 1. Choice of Organizational Control Mode. 
Second, combinations of control modes are not included in Ouchi’s framework. Ouchi (1980) argues 
that markets, bureaucracies and clans are three distinct mechanisms that operate independently of each 
other.  However, the research stream based on the model in Figure 1 frequently comments that 
different control modes are applied in combination (See, for example, Henderson & Lee 1992, Kirsch 
1996, Nidumolu and Subramani 2003).  
For example, Kirsch (1996) writes: “While multiple types of control were measured in this research, 
this study was based on a tradition in the control literature of examining the relationship between a set 
of environmental characteristics and each mode of control. Consequently, the focus was not on how 
controls are used in combination in organizations” (Italics added for emphasis).  She goes on to 
comment that the correlations among control modes are significant and concludes: “These correlations 
suggest that, when control mechanisms are put in place, it is likely that multiple types of mechanisms 
are implemented.” This and similar speculations about combinations of control modes motivated the 
second question guiding this research: How do combinations of control modes influence organization 
performance?   
It is worth noting that there are alternative control models proposed, including Jaworski (1988) and 
Anderson and Oliver (1987) in sales force management, and Flamholtz et al (1985) in accounting 
control. With limited empirical support (Jaworski et al. 1993; Anderson and Oliver 1994), there have 
been few adoptions of these models outside their respective domain.   
3 EFFECTS OF CONTROL MODES ON PERFORMANCE  
To develop a more complete and complex normative model of the effects on performance of control 
modes than is implicit in Figure 1, this study draws from three research streams. The first includes 
goal setting theory (Locke & Latham 1990), management by objective (MBO)(Tosi & Carroll 1968, 
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Greenwood 1981, Rodgers & Hunter 1992) and outcome-based performance management (Bevan & 
Hood 2006, Heinrich 2002, 2007) to explain the effects on performance of output control. The second 
includes organization learning theory (March 1991) and process management (Benner & Tushman 
2003) to explain the effect on performance of exploitative and exploratory processes. The third is the 
literature on human resource management (HRM), which explains the effects on performance of input 
control (Snell 1992, Delaney & Huselid 1996, Evans & Davis 2005).  
First, goal setting affects performance in two ways (Locke & Latham 1990). When task uncertainty is 
low, goal setting increases individuals’ motivation to perform, affecting the direction, persistence and 
level of an individual’s effort. This is called the goal motivation effect. In contrast, when task 
uncertainty is high, goal setting stimulates individuals to look for innovative solutions. This is called 
the goal strategy effect. Goal setting theory is one of the most rigorous and extensive research streams 
in management theory While its primary level of analysis is individual behavior, the MBO and 
outcome-based performance management literatures extend the goal setting approach to organization 
behavior and performance.  
Second, organization learning theory also specifies different mechanisms by which processes affect 
performance when task uncertainty is high versus when it is low (March 1991, Benner & Tushman 
2000). Exploitative behavior delivers high performance when task uncertainty is low and exploratory 
behavior delivers high performance when task uncertainty is high. The learning approach an 
organization adopts influences the choices and effects of control modes.  
Third, the HRM literature examines various approaches to the development of human capital and their 
effects on organization performance (Evans & Davis 2005, Delaney & Huselid 1996). Essentially, its 
focus is on the link between input control and performance. This study draws from a subset from this 
stream to develop the hypotheses on the link between input control and performance.  
Since the two underlying theories, partitions tasks into high/low task uncertainty contexts, the 
discussions below inherit this practice and the two theories can be integrated.   
3.1 Low Task Uncertainty 
In goal setting theory, when task uncertainty is low, performance is a positive function of the goal 
setting motivational effect on the level of effort, and its direction and persistence. Goals affect the 
intensity of effort an individual expends on a task. They also affect its direction and duration, 
motivating individuals to persist in their actions until the goal is reached. Goals motivate individuals to 
adopt goal-relevant actions, while ignoring non-goal-relevant activities (Locke & Latham 1990).  At 
the organization level of analysis, the management by objective (MBO) literature (Tosi & Carroll 
1968, Greenwood 1981, Rodgers & Hunter 1992) and the literature on outcome-based performance 
management (Bevan & Hood 2006, Heinrich 2002, 2007) support the general assumption  that setting 
goals increases incremental, continuous improvements in organization performance. Formally: 
Hypothesis 1: When task uncertainty is low, performance is a positive function of output control. 
In organization learning theory when task uncertainty is low, performance is improved through the 
exploitation of knowledge about existing practices (March 1991). Adjustments to existing behavior 
improve mean performance and reduce performance variance (Benner & Tushman 2003). This occurs 
through single loop learning. This learning leads to improvement in business processes and reduction 
of costs through standardization and routinization, i.e. behavior control (March 1991, McGrath 2001).  
This exploitation effect on performance of process improvements relies on comprehensive knowledge. 
Low task uncertainty is conducive to comprehensive knowledge which enables the specification of 
effective design processes (Fredrickson 1984, Pisano 1994). In such situations, organization learning 
theory predicts that exploitative learning through comprehensive process management generates 
positive organization outcomes (March 1991, McGrath 2001, Benner & Tushman 2002, 2003). 
Formally: 
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Hypothesis 2: When task uncertainty is low, performance is a positive function of behavior control. 
Input control regulates the human resource-based antecedent conditions of performance, specifically, 
the knowledge, skills, abilities, values and motives of employees (Snell 1992). Approaches for 
enhancing employees’ skills include selection, training and development activities (Delaney & Huselid 
1996, Evans & Davis 2005). Various conceptual frameworks, including agency theory, resource-based 
view, institutional theory, to name a few, have been used to explain the link between HRM practices 
and organization performance (Delaney & Huselid 1996). Empirical results show that staff selectivity 
is related to organization level performance (Becker & Huselid 1992, Schmidt et al. 1979). Training 
and development activities improve organization performance (Bartel 1994, Knoke & Kalleberg 
1994). When task uncertainty is low, input control supports exploitative learning, including training 
for established processes and learning from past projects. These impact directly on performance. In 
contrast, when task uncertainty is high, as discussed below, input control practices that support 
exploratory learning are likely to be effective. Formally: 
Hypothesis 3: When task uncertainty is low, performance is a positive function of input control. 
Now, consider the interactions between those control modes. First, examine the interaction between 
behavior and output controls. When behavior control is weak, processes are not monitored and 
reinforced by management, non-optimal behavior develops. In those circumstances, increases in 
output-based motivation, the goal setting motivation effect, have a limited positive effect on 
performance. Instead, the increased motivation reinforces the emergent non-optimal behavior. Thus, 
when behavior control is weak, the effect on performance of output control is limited.  
In contrast, when behavior control is effective, increases in output-based motivation reinforce the 
effective behavior and, therefore, have strong positive effects on performance. This is because process 
improvement typically involves the use of process effectiveness measures and statistical methods 
based on goals or output control for variation reduction in processes and outputs (Garvin 1995; Harry 
& Schroeder 2000).   This is consistent with Benner and Tushman (2003), who, implicitly but not 
explicitly, model the effect of exploitative behavior to include an interaction between, rather than 
simply an additive function of, output and behavior control.  
Specifically, Benner and Tushman (2003) argue that business process management approaches 
typically involve three practices: process mapping, process improvement and adhering to the improved 
processes. During the mapping process, the functions of a business entity are defined, the responsible 
person is identified, and the expected standard and success criteria, or goals, for a business process are 
specified (Deming 1982, Juran 1988). The mapped and improved processes need to be adhered to reap 
potential business benefits from repeated processes, e.g. reliable measurement data for and continuous 
improvement in outputs (Mukherjee et al. 1998). The quality of the processes moderate the 
performance effects of output control. Formally: 
Hypothesis 4: When task uncertainty is low, behavior control moderates the effect of output control on 
performance. 
Second, consider the interaction between output and input control. From goal setting theory, output 
control increases performance through its effect on extrinsic motivation (Hypothesis 1). Input control, 
by selecting for and improving employees’ ability to learn and work independently, increases 
performance through its effect on intrinsic motivation (Hypothesis 3). Drawing on cognitive 
evaluation theory (Anderson & Oliver 1987), total motivation is less than the sum of the expected 
independent intrinsic and extrinsic effects.  
Deci and Ryan argue that high extrinsic motivation erodes high intrinsic motivation because certain 
forms of output control, including negative performance feedback and deadlines, decrease intrinsic 
motivation (Deci 1972, Ryan & Deci 2000). So, when the effect of input control on intrinsic 
motivation is combined with the effect of output control on extrinsic motivation, the interaction of the 
two modes of control has less effect on performance than the sum of their expected individual effects. 
Formally: 
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Hypothesis 5:  When task uncertainty is low, output control moderates the effect of input control on 
performance. 
In our review of the literature, we did not identify a theoretical model of or compelling speculation for 
an interaction between behavior and input control, and the effect of that interaction on organization 
performance. So, no hypothesis is developed and presented here.  
3.2 High Task Uncertainty 
Now, consider the context when task uncertainty is high. The basic argument for the use of input 
control is well stated by Snell and Youndt (1995): Drawing on the work of researchers such as 
Dimmick and Murray (1978), an HRM control system based on input control, including rigorous 
staffing, training and induction, has a positive effect on organization performance. Specifically, 
Cardinal (2001) found that input control enhances innovation for the typically uncertain R&D projects.  
Snell and Youndt (1995) note that the positive effect of input control, when task uncertainty is high, is 
consistent with the arguments in the knowledge management literature on the transformation to 
flexible, knowledge-based organizations (See, for example, Nonaka 1991). This is particularly the case 
in high task uncertainty contexts, where, unable to rely on past successful behavior, high performance 
depends on an organization’s knowledge base (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois 1988). Similarly, Nonaka and 
Takeuchi (1995) argues that it is the redundant and overlapping information sets in a knowledge base 
that support organization innovation and variety. Input control, through selection, training and 
induction, helps develop those knowledge sets and supports access to them by developing and 
reinforcing values that support increased communication and interaction (Barker 1993, Flamholtz et 
al. 1985, Turner & Makhija 2006). 
Increased interaction gives managers access to diverse knowledge (Hoopes & Postrel 1999). This 
knowledge is typically tacit rather than explicit. The ability to exchange that knowledge facilitates its 
recombination, generating new insights (Galunic & Rodan 1998). Those insights, generating 
innovative actions, are the basis of exploratory learning (March 1991, Turner & Makhija 2006).  
Under conditions of high uncertainty, experiential learning becomes a crucial part of the development 
process such as on the job training, job rotation and mentoring (Swap et al. 2001). In contrast to low 
uncertainty conditions, where the development is likely to be focused on learning past experience and 
the application of known, stable work processes, development in high task uncertainty situations, that 
supports exploratory learning and facilitate entrepreneurial intuition, e.g. experiencing and 
understanding work processes, problem solving and work languages, impact positively on 
organization performance.  
Consistent with the extant control theory (Ouchi 1979, Snell 1992, Cardinal 2001) and the HRM 
literature (Becker & Huselid 1992, Schmidt et al. 1979, Bartel 1994, Knoke & Kalleberg 1994), the 
selection, development and training of employees has a positive effect on firm performance. Formally:   
Hypothesis 6:  When task uncertainty is high, performance is a positive function of input control. 
It is implicit in the dominant model of organizational control theory in Figure 1 that, under high task 
uncertainty, both output and behavioral controls have weak or no effects on performance. Now, while 
Hypothesis 1 is based on the goal motivation effect when task uncertainty is low, when task 
uncertainty is high, performance is a positive function of the goal strategy effect--challenging goals 
stimulate the search for innovative ways to meet the targets (Locke & Latham 1990, p 96).  
The discovery of new task strategies is also consistent with exploratory learning processes, which 
involve risk taking, experimentation and innovation (March 1991, Benner & Tushman 2003). 
Adaptation through exploratory learning processes fits high task uncertainty contexts, where changes 
are unpredictable (Eisenhardt & Martin 2000). In those contexts, successful performance depends 
upon generating a sufficient number of novel solutions or options so that some are successful 
(McGrath 2001). In this way, specific, challenging goals stimulate the process of exploratory learning 
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to identify options. In addition, when performance is below their aspiration levels, decision makers 
take on more risks (Tversky & Kahneman 1986, Abrahamson 1996, Abrahamson & Fairchild 1999), 
engaging in exploratory search processes  (March 1991) and experimenting with new processes, 
technologies and strategies (Baum et al. 2005).  
Empirical evidence from studies of software development (Nidumolu & Subramani 2003, Choudhury 
& Sabherwal 2003) and pharmaceutical R&D projects (Cardinal 2001) provides further support that 
output control has a positive effect on performance when task uncertainty is high. The literature on 
software project risk management also reports that output control has a positive effect on performance 
(Barki et al. 2001, Rustagi et al. 2008). Both studies report that the use of output controls, including, 
for example, monitoring project status, is associated with improved performance. Formally: 
Hypothesis 7: When task uncertainty is high, performance is a positive function of output control. 
Now, consider the effect of behavior control on performance. Essentially, behavior control is the basis 
of standard operating procedures (SOPs). The effective application of SOPs requires that organizations 
have complete understanding of the interdependences among the tasks to deliver high performance 
(Eisenhardt 1985, Snell 1992, Turner & Makhija 2006). While this condition is typically satisfied 
when task uncertainty is low, it is unlikely to be satisfied when task uncertainty is high.  
Consistent with this, Ittner and Larcker (1997) report a positive effect of behavior control on 
performance in the low task uncertainty auto industry of the ‘90s (See Hypothesis 2 above) but no 
relationship in the dynamic, high task uncertainty, computer industry. This absence of a positive effect 
of behavior control on performance when task uncertainty is high is consistent with its implicit null 
effect in the dominant organizational presented control model in Figure 1. Formally:     
Hypothesis 8: When task uncertainty is high, performance is independent of behavior control. 
Finally, consider the interaction between input and output controls when task uncertainty is high. As 
argued above (Hypothesis 7), when task uncertainty is high, output control increases performance by 
improving the task strategy selected. This is the goal strategy effect (Locke & Latham 1990) rather 
than the goal motivation effect that underpins Hypothesis 1.  
Therefore, when task uncertainty is high, unlike the case when task uncertainty is low (Hypothesis 5), 
there is no interaction between input and output controls on performance. This is because the intrinsic 
motivation effect of input control on performance is independent of the strategy selection effect of 
output control on performance. Therefore, the effects of input and output controls on performance are 
additive. Formally: 
Hypothesis 9: When task uncertainty is high, input and output controls have independent effects on 
performance.    
4 EXTENSIONS TO THE DOMINANT MODEL 
Hypotheses 1-9 present a theory of organization control in which the effects on performance of control 
modes are contingent on task uncertainty. A comparison of this theory with the dominant model shows 
that the implicit normative model in Figure 1 can be treated as a restricted sub-model of the more 
general model developed above. Table 1 lists Hypotheses 1-9, indicating where they are similar to and 
where they extend the dominant model. To do this, we make the assumption that the high/high and 
low/low cells in Figure 1 are equivalent to low and high task uncertainty contexts, respectively. Then, 
inspecting Table 1 reveals that the implicit normative model presented in Figure 1 is a special case of 
the normative model developed above.  
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 6 re-state the direct effects of output and behavior control on performance in the 
high/high cell and the effect of input control in the low/low cell in Figure 1. Hypothesis 8 makes 
explicit the implicit null effect of behavior control on performance in the low/low cell.  
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Control Modes       High Task Uncertainty       Low Task Uncertainty 
Output         H7              H1 (dominant model) 
Behavior         H8 (null effect: dominant model)              H2 (dominant model) 
Input         H6 (dominant model)              H3 
Behavior x Output         H8  (null effect)              H4 
Output x Input         H9              H5 
Table 1. A Comparison of two Theories. 
Hypotheses 3 and 7 extend the dominant model by predicting direct effects for input control on 
performance in the high/high cell and output control on performance in the low/low cell, respectively. 
Hypotheses 4 and 5 extend the model by predicting interaction effects on performance in the high/high 
cell between behavior control and output control, and input control and output control, respectively. In 
the former case, the dominant model includes the individual effects of each mode of control but does 
not include the relationship between them and the effect on performance of that relationship. In the 
latter case, the dominant model does not include the effect of input control on performance. Therefore, 
it neither considers the relationship between input and output control nor the effect on performance of 
that relationship. Finally, Hypothesis 9 shows that the effects of input and output control on 
performance in the low/low cell are independent of each other. 
5 DISCUSSION 
In this section, the implications of the new normative model for theory development are discussed 
first. In particular, our focus is on the explanatory power of the new model in comparison with the 
concept of “balance of control modes”. Then, the implications for practice are illustrated and 
conclusions are drawn.  
5.1 Implications for Theory 
The effect on performance of interactions among control modes is the motivation for a critique of the 
concept of balance in the use of control modes. The extant research on the effect on performance of 
combinations of control modes is limited to simply aggregating their joint effects without specifying 
the functional form of those effects. For example, Jaworski et al. (1993) combine output and behavior 
control into formal control, and clan and self control into informal control, and then analyze the effect 
on performance of combinations of formal and informal control modes; and Long et al. (2002) 
compare the aggregate effect of behavior, output and input control on performance with the 
independent effect on performance of each control mode.  
Exploring the dynamics of control modes, Cardinal et al. (2004) analyze the effect of reducing the 
emphasis on output and input control, interpreted as unbalancing the control modes, in phase two of a 
start up furniture removal business. The use of behavior control on its own resulted in a major drop in 
performance. Reintroducing output and input controls, interpreted as rebalancing the control modes, 
reversed this loss of performance.  
Cardinal et al. (2004) define balance as “a state where an organization exhibits a harmonious use of 
multiple forms of control.” They offer no definition of ‘harmonious’ independent of the effect on 
performance of the combination of output, behavior and input controls adopted in phase three. Nor do 
they consider in what context that combination of controls would not be harmonious or, at least, would 
not be successful. 
The theory developed above offers insights into both of those issues. When task uncertainty is low, 
organization performance is a function of output, behavior and input controls, and of the interactions 
between output and behavior controls, and input and output controls. Balance requires the effective 
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combination of output and behavior control (Hypothesis 4). A comparison of performance against the 
goals provides feedback to incrementally refine the behavior controls and capture the benefits of 
exploitative behavior (Turner & Makhija 2006, Benner & Tushman 2003). At the same time, the focus 
on output control should not be too strong; otherwise it would risk a loss of intrinsic motivation from 
the interaction of output and input controls (Hypothesis 5). 
The above definition of balance is specific to the low task uncertainty context. Balance in a high 
uncertainty context is simply the additive effects on performance of output and input controls 
(Hypothesis 9). These findings are consistent with Nidumolu and Subramani (2003), and Choudhury 
and Sabherwal (2003) findings. Nidumolu and Subramani (2003) report no effect on performance of 
standardization of methods, behavior control, but a strong effect on performance of standardization of 
performance criteria, output control. They also report a positive effect on performance of 
decentralization of methods, dependent on input control.  
Similarly, Choudhury and Sabherwal (2003) report the importance of output and input (selection of 
vendor capability) control on outsourcing software development performance. When performance was 
unsatisfactory in three of the five projects they researched, both forms of control were increased. 
Behavior control was not considered to be an effective control mode in this high task uncertainty 
context because behaviour observability was low.  
5.2 Implications for Practice 
We draw four implications for practice from the extended theory of organizational control developed 
above. First, under conditions of high task uncertainty, behavior control may confer the illusion of 
control in a challenging and uncertain environment. However, it does not improve performance. Large 
IT projects represent the classic instance of this false assumption. Methodologies, specifying detailed 
sets of procedures, are rigorously followed with frequently disappointing results. Basing control theory 
on a foundation of goal-setting and learning theories helps explain this lesson. 
Second, the performance achieved through reliance on a single mode of control can always be 
improved upon by the adoption of other control modes, with the exception of behavior control under 
high uncertainty. In particular, organizations that rely solely on aggressive output targets or 
bureaucracies that rely exclusively on behavior controls should be encouraged to adopt a portfolio of 
controls appropriate to the context. This has potentially important implications for IS project 
management and outsourcing. 
Third, it is important to recognize that different mixes of controls support different strategies in 
different contexts. This requires fine tuning the mix of controls to the context, capturing the benefits of 
exploitation in low task uncertainty contexts and exploration in high uncertainty contexts. Therefore, 
when attempting to realize the benefits of exploitation in a low uncertainty context, for example, data 
centre outsourcing, it is appropriate to implement strong behavior controls, but the output targets 
should not be so challenging as to shift the strategy from one of exploitation to one of exploration. 
Conversely, in the case of an exploration strategy under high uncertainty, for example, an IS-based, 
organization transformational project, conservative targets may fail to adequately motivate the search 
for innovation. In goal setting terms, exploitation sets high but achievable goals, consistent with 
processes including TQM and six sigma. Exploration sets stretch goals.  
Fourth, exploration and exploitation need to be managed under distinct control regimes. To attempt to 
achieve both using the same portfolio of controls is counterproductive. Abernathy (1978) presents an 
early critique of the idea that organizations should focus on both cost reductions and innovation. Porter 
(1980) treats these strategies as mutually exclusive. The control profiles developed above for the two 
contexts are mutually incompatible. 
Now apply these insights to the popular CMM model. It classifies organisations’ maturity for 
managing IS projects into five levels from ad hoc to continuous improvement (Humphrey 1989). To 
progress from level 1 to level 3, organisations need to put in place basic project and software 
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engineering management practices and define basic processes for measuring project outcomes and 
training personnel. In levels 4 and 5, process outcomes are measured and the processes are subjected 
to continuous improvement efforts.   
Progressing from level 1 to level 3 represents the formal implementation of a mix of basic output, 
input and behavioural control modes that would improve performance independent of whether the 
context is one of low task uncertainty, for example, outsourcing a data centre, or high uncertainty, for 
example, outsourcing an organization-transforming software development. Progressing to levels 4 and 
5 is consistent with maximising the benefits of exploitative learning in the case of the data centre 
outsourcing. In contrast, it would be counter productive in the case of the transformational software 
development.  
Empirical studies on the effects of implementing CMM on IS project performance suggests that the 
benefits of progressing one level up from lower levels (e.g. from levels 1 to 2 or from 2 to 3) are 
associated with substantial improvements in project performance while the improvements for 
achieving levels 4 & 5 appear to be limited (Harter et al. 2000, Galin and Avrahami 2006). It may be 
that the benefits of moving from level 3 to levels 4 or 5 are contingent on project context. 
Certainly, most organization theorists consider that exploration and exploitation are competing rather 
than compatible organizational processes (Adler et al. 1999, March 1991, Teece et al. 1997, Benner & 
Tushman 2003). As Benner and Tushman (2003) conclude: “To create dual organization structures, 
senior teams must develop techniques that permit them to be consistently inconsistent as they steer a 
balance between the need to be small and large, centralized and decentralized, and focused on both the 
short and the long term, simultaneously (Gavetti & Levinthal 2000, Hedberg et al. 1976, Weick 
1995)”. In revised theory, the different portfolios of control recommended for low and high task 
uncertainty contexts help explain why these strategies are incompatible rather than complementary. 
5.3 Re-engineering the Context 
The theory developed above shows that, in the short term, managers should adapt their portfolio of 
controls to fit the context. In the longer term, an alternative is to transform a high task uncertainty 
context into a low task uncertainty context. This is the transition typically followed as an industry 
matures. The benefit of such a shift is the higher performance achievable in a low task uncertainty 
context compared with a high task uncertainty context (Liu & Yetton 2007).  
In addition, organization contexts are characterized by cycles of technological variation, alternating 
between periods of incremental change and periods of rapid innovation (Abernathy & Utterback 1978, 
Uzumeri & Sanderson 1995, Tushman & Anderson 1986). A period of discontinuous innovation ends 
when a new dominant design emerges (Abernathy 1978, Anderson & Tushman 1990, Benner & 
Tushman 2003, Tushman & Rosenkopf 1992).  
This describes a cycle from low task uncertainty to high task uncertainty, and back to low task 
uncertainty, as the market moves from a dominant design through a period of innovation until a new 
dominant design emerges. This suggests the interesting question of whether it is more effective to 
retain the mix of control modes appropriate for a low task uncertainty context, while the market shifts 
to a high task uncertainty context. Then, when the new dominant design is identified, adopt a fast 
follower strategy. Alternatively, the organization could experiment with the development of new IT 
systems in house, while task uncertainty is high, and outsource the new systems, when task uncertainty 
becomes low with the emergence of the new dominant design.. This extension to the theory developed 
here should be the subject of future research. 
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